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Executive Summary 1) This study examines perceptions of Western democracy promotion among its “targets” 
in Morocco – namely, N�Os, political party activists and parliamentarians, representatives 
of the judiciary and the state, journalists, and academics. Underlying this question is the 
assumption that perceptions of legitimacy and credibility are crucial for the effectiveness of 
democracy promotion, which touches sensitive institutions at the core of the political sys-
tem. Legitimacy and credibility are particularly crucial in the Arab region, where suspicion of 
official political motives is rife. This report see�s to answer questions such as: Do Moroccan 
actors feel that they can legitimately accept democracy assistance from Western govern-
ments or organizations? Are some forms of democracy promotion, or certain sources of fund-
ing, perceived as more (or less) legitimate than others? In what ways (if at all) does Western 
funding alter public perceptions of an actor receiving democracy assistance? To what extent 
do different categories of actors (civil society activists versus civil servants, religious versus 
secular party representatives, etc) perceive Western democracy promotion differently?
2) Perceptions of those at the receiving end of democracy assistance have not been granted 
much attention in the already very substantial literature on democracy promotion. Instead, 
the focus of writings on the MENA region and Morocco, as elsewhere, has been on four, 
mainly donor-centred, issues: why Western states promote democracy in the region; what 
democracy-promoting actors are doing (or not doing); how effective and consistent de-
mocracy promotion efforts have been; and what specific problems and challenges Western 
countries have faced in see�ing to promote democracy in the Arab World. This study adds 
a new angle to this literature.
3) Morocco is a monarchy where the �ing effectively controls the executive, the judiciary, 
the legislature and the armed forces. In addition, he owns vast swaths of the economy and 
is Commander of the Faithful. The country is nevertheless often perceived as one of the 
most liberal and progressive of the MENA region and thus a promising target for democ-
racy promotion. This is due to reforms implemented over the last two decades, including 
the introduction of a directly elected lower house, the prohibition of torture, the emerging 
participation of opposition in government, the institution of a commission to investigate 
previous repression, and the revamping of the personal status code to strengthen the posi-
tion of women.
4) Morocco receives democracy and governance assistance from the European Union and, 
to a lesser extent, from individual EU governments, most notably �ermany, France, and 
Spain. The United States and Canada also provide Morocco with democracy support. West-
ern N�Os are active in the area as well. In addition to democracy assistance, respect for 
democratic principles is included in the main agreements and initiatives existing between 
Morocco, on the one hand, and EU states, on the other. Morocco welcomed its first interna-
tional election observation mission in 2007.
5) This study finds that, contrary to some expectations, there has been no severe bac�lash 
against democracy promotion in Morocco to date. Virtually no actor will outright refuse to 
wor� with Western partners: all Moroccan actors, from Islamists to feminists, are involved 
in some form of international collaboration. Religious parties and N�Os tend to prefer part-
nership and debate with Western interlocutors, rather than receiving financial assistance, 
which in some instances is entirely rejected.
6) There is, however, refusal to cooperate with the US government in some quarters, and 
the US embassy and US government bodies in Morocco have been targeted by boycotts of 
various �inds on the part of both civil society and political actors of all stripes, in particular 
since the beginning of the war in Iraq. This rejection has, however, almost always been con-
fined to American government representatives, while the willingness to wor� with US civil 
society seems to have remained intact. As regards the Europeans, there are disagreements 
as to the legitimacy of the EU’s policy of excluding moderate Islamists from its democracy 
promotion programmes. 
6) Moroccan actors universally perceive foreign states as promoting democracy in their own 
self-interest, but do not subsequently conclude that there are any conspiracies or plots to 
undermine the country or its independence, and do not engage in “CIA spotting”. Most 
interviewees agree that the perception of a Moroccan organization is not automatically 
altered if it accepts funds or participates in programmes with foreign donors (although ac-
cepting funds from US donors can have an impact on the image of the recipient), as long as 
goals and methods are clearly set and finances are transparent. 
7) This generally nuanced stance reflects the fact that: (a) Moroccan parliamentarians, po-
litical party representatives and N�Os – here confined to the larger, policy-oriented N�Os 
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– have most often reached a well-defined and stable position vis-à-vis foreign donors and 
initiatives, and (b) that the position adopted can almost always be encompassed by one 
word: pragmatism.
8) The Moroccan government has not, as some of its counterparts elsewhere in the MENA 
region, played the “traitor” card against N�Os or other actors that accept foreign funding, 
having, on the contrary, encouraged N�Os to see� Western assistance. Islamists have also 
largely avoided that argument vis-à-vis secular N�Os in recent years (not least because 
they themselves have shown willingness to wor� with Western partners). 
9) The international election observation mission of the 2007 parliamentary elections was 
perceived as relatively limited and “light” on the ground. Its conclusions are for the most part 
not disputed, not least because they ran closely in line with those of national observers.
10) It must be underlined that this “lac� of a bac�lash” against democracy promotion in 
Morocco to date does not mean that it has been adverted for good: if Western policy to-
wards the wider region ta�es another turn for the worse, attitudes could very well change. 
The opacity of some foreign donors (particularly some N�Os and quasi-N�Os) as to their 
own sources of funding also poses a problem. Moreover, if Moroccan N�O representatives 
become perceived as either pursuing foreign agendas – through insensitive donor med-
dling – or as using this money for their own enrichment, this could certainly also lead to a 
bac�lash.
11) Lastly, it must be stressed that this is a pilot study, the conclusions of which cannot nec-
essarily be extended to other parts of the MENA region – indeed, in some ways, they seem 
quite specific to the Moroccan case. As such, similar research should ideally be conducted 
elsewhere in the region.
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Democratisation has been the stated goal of many Western states’ policies in the Arab 
world since the end of the cold war.1 This aim became something of a foreign policy mantra 
after the Al Qaeda attac�s of 11 September 2001 in New Yor�: this and subsequent attac�s 
in Madrid and London led Western governments to stress democratization in Arab coun-
tries as one way of addressing the “root causes” of terrorism.
The West has not applied its democratizing zeal evenly across the Middle East and North 
Africa (MENA) region, however. Morocco, as one of the most liberal regimes of the region 
and, simultaneously, both a victim of terror and the country of origin of some terrorists ac-
tive in Western Europe, has been a main target of Western democracy promotion in recent 
years. Whether democracy promotion – including support for civil society, political parties 
and independent media, assistance to the parliament and the judiciary, electoral observa-
tion missions, positive and negative conditionalities,2 and public praise and criticism – has 
had any effect has been widely debated, within and outside the region.
This report examines a different, but related, question: how have the EU, US and other West-
ern democracy promotion activities been perceived in Morocco? This question is underlined 
by the assumption that perceptions of legitimacy and credibility are crucial for the effective-
ness of democracy promotion, which by its very nature touches sensitive institutions at the 
core of the political system. Legitimacy and credibility are particularly crucial in the Arab 
region, where suspicion of official political motives is rife. It is not enough, then, that the 
policies be well-tailored to local needs, appropriately funded, and professionally executed: 
if the activities are seen as opaque and suspect, they are nevertheless li�ely to fail. Worse, a 
severe lac� of credibility and legitimacy could undermine the whole endeavour by discredit-
ing those that wor� to promote democracy and the goal of democratisation itself.
Unli�e many other studies on Western democracy promotion in the MENA region, the focus 
of this study centres on the receiving end of such policies. The aim is to examine the degree 
of legitimacy and credibility attributed to democracy promotion in the eyes of those who 
have come in direct or indirect contact with such programmes (such as representatives of 
the media, parliament, N�Os, political parties, the state, etc). This report thus see�s to 
answer questions such as:
Do Moroccan actors feel they can legitimately accept democracy assistance from 
Western governments or organizations?
Are some forms of democracy promotion, or certain sources of funding, perceived 
as more (or less) legitimate than others?
In what ways (if at all) does Western funding alter public perceptions of an actor 
receiving democracy assistance?
Why do some actors refuse Western funds, and who are they?
How are Western democratic conditionalities, criticism, and praise perceived? Are 
they seen as influential in moving society towards political change?
To what extent do different categories of actors (for example, civil society activ-
ists versus civil servants, or religious versus secular party representatives) perceive 
Western democracy promotion differently?
The main finding of this study is that there has been no severe bac�lash against democracy 
promotion in Morocco to date. This contrasts sharply with government and popular reac-
tions in a number of other countries in the region, such as Egypt and select �ulf states. At 
the same time, this study also highlights that focusing on the actual “targets” of democ-
racy assistance – N�Os, political party activists and parliamentarians, representatives of 
the judiciary and the state, journalists, and academics – rather than on political leaders or 
the general public, can reveal a richer and more nuanced picture of how democracy promo-
tion is perceived in the recipient country. 
This study shows that virtually no actor will refuse outright to wor� with any Western part-
ner. Religious parties and N�Os tend to prefer partnership and debate with Western inter-
locutors over financial assistance, which is in some instances completely rejected. There is, 
however, firm rejection of one particular Western interlocutor – namely the US government, 
which has been targeted by boycotts of various �inds on the part of both civil society and 
political actors of all stripes, in particular since the beginning of the war in Iraq. This rejec-
tion is, however, almost always confined to the American government: the willingness to 
•
•
•
•
•
•
Introduction
1 The author wishes to than� first and foremost Jaber 
Afou�ane and Houda El �heloufi of �ERM (�roupe-
ment d’Études et de Recherches sur la Méditerranée) 
for their invaluable help with identifying and trac�ing 
down potential interviewees for this study. Prof. �had-
ija Elmadmad was also extremely �ind and helpful in 
getting me in touch with �ey people, particularly in 
the justice sector. My heartfelt gratitude also goes to 
all Moroccan professionals who so generously shared 
their time and insights. Finally, many than�s to Fouad 
M. Ammor, Dere� Lutterbec�, and Tobias Schumacher 
for reading and commenting on earlier versions of this 
manuscript. The analysis in this report, as well as any 
errors, are solely the author’s.
2 Positive conditionalities consist in rewarding demo-
cratic reform with favours sought by MENA countries, 
such as development assistance, trade liberalisation, 
and more inclusive association agreements, while 
negative conditionalities may involve punishing un-
democratic behaviour by withdrawing favours or im-
posing sanctions of various �inds.
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wor� with US civil society organisations remains intact. Europeans face no such problems. 
However, there are disagreements as to the legitimacy of the EU’s policy of excluding mod-
erate Islamists from their democracy promotion programmes.
Moroccan actors universally perceive foreign states as promoting democracy in their own 
self-interest, but do not conclude as a result that there are any conspiracies or plots to un-
dermine the country or its independence, and do not engage in “CIA spotting”. Most inter-
viewees agree that the perception of a Moroccan organisation is not automatically altered 
if it accepts funds or participates in programmes with foreign donors (although accepting 
funds from US donors can have an impact on the image of the recipient), as long as goals 
and methods are set and finances are transparent.
All this shows, firstly, that Moroccan parliamentarians, political party representatives and 
N�Os – here confined to the larger, policy-oriented N�Os – have usually reached a well-de-
fined and stable position vis-à-vis foreign donors and initiatives. Secondly, it indicates that 
the adopted position can almost always be captured in one word: pragmatism. This stance 
is also reflected in the policy of the Moroccan government. It has not, as has its Egyptian 
counterpart for example, played the “traitor” card against N�Os or other actors accepting 
foreign funds, but has in practice encouraged N�Os to see� Western financing. Islamists 
have also largely avoided pursuing that line of argument vis-à-vis secular N�Os in recent 
years (not least because they themselves have shown willingness to wor� with Western 
partners).
The international election observation mission of the 2007 parliamentary elections – the 
first such mission in Moroccan history – was perceived as relatively limited and “light” 
on the ground. Its conclusions are for the most part not disputed, not least because they 
remained close in line with those of national observers.
It must be underlined that the relative “lac� of a bac�lash” against democracy promotion 
in Morocco to date does not mean that such a bac�lash has been averted for good: if West-
ern policy towards the wider region ta�es another turn for the worse, it could very well 
change. The opacity of some foreign donors (particularly some N�Os and quasi-N�Os) as 
to their own sources of funding is also a potential source of a future bac�lash. Moreover, 
if Moroccan N�O representatives are believed to be pursuing foreign agendas – through 
insensitive donor meddling – or as using the funds for their own enrichment, this bac�lash 
may emerge.
Lastly, it must be stressed that this is a pilot study covering only Morocco and that its con-
clusions cannot necessarily be extended to other parts of the MENA region. Indeed, they 
seem quite specific to the Moroccan case, as the only politically liberalizing country of the 
Maghreb. Similar research should thus ideally be conducted elsewhere in the wider region, 
seeing as results will most certainly vary significantly.
The study begins with an overview of the current literature on democracy promotion in the 
MENA region and Morocco, showing that it has tended to be rather donor-focused: little 
has, for instance, been written on the question of perceptions of legitimacy and credibility 
on the receiving end of these efforts. Section 2 goes on to provide a brief survey of the 
democracy promoting activities of Western governments and organisations. These initial 
sections aim to provide the necessary bac�drop to the analysis of Moroccan perceptions of 
Western democracy promotion found in section 3. A series of concrete policy recommenda-
tions are then outlined in the conclusion. 
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The perceptions of those at the receiving end of democracy assistance have not been given 
much attention in the already very substantial literature devoted to democracy promotion. 
Writings on the MENA region and Morocco, as elsewhere, tend to focus on four, mainly 
donor-centred, issues: why Western states promote democracy in the region; what democ-
racy promoting actors are doing (or not doing); how effective and consistent democracy 
promotion efforts have been; and what specific problems and challenges Western coun-
tries have faced in see�ing to promote democracy in the Arab World.
There is little agreement on why Western states promote democracy in the MENA region. 
For the EU, in particular, the objective of ensuring stability and reducing migration in its 
southern neighbourhood (Morocco is an especially significant source and transit country 
for irregular immigration into the EU) is often highlighted as an important rationale under-
lying its democracy promotion activities – as well as, incidentally, the limits to these efforts 
– in the southern Mediterranean.3 As already mentioned, the lac� of democracy in MENA 
states has also been pin-pointed as one of the “root causes” of terrorism. The fostering of 
democracy in the region has thus often been justified, particularly, but not only, by the US 
government, as a �ey element in the “war on terrorism”.4 Although not focusing specifically 
on the Arab World, others claim that in a globalising world, the interests of international 
capital – represented by the American state – see liberal democracy as the best way to 
assure stability and popular acquiescence in the developing world. The US government 
therefore initiated its democracy promotion in the 1980s. Nevertheless, the aim is not to 
create truly democratic political systems, but rather to ensure structures of rule that sup-
port neo-liberal economic reforms, while co-opting mass movements for social change.5 
Within the MENA region – although not primarily in Morocco – a variant of this argument, 
focused on Western powers’ attempts to control Arab governments, and hence oil supply, 
is quite widespread.6
As a consequence of the sometimes bewildering plethora of actors and activities involved, 
descriptive and comparative studies are quite numerous: as subsequent sections will 
show, not only governments, but also a wide range of intergovernmental organizations, 
N�Os and quasi-N�Os, attempt to promote democracy in Morocco and the other MENA 
states, using a wide variety of means. Probably the best purely descriptive presentation 
of US government agencies, quasi-governmental and non-governmental agencies active 
in democracy promotion in the Middle East is published by the Carnegie Endowment.7 In a 
number of studies, Richard Youngs focuses on EU democracy promotion in the Middle East 
and North Africa, analyzing the specificities and scope of European Union assistance. He 
notes, for example, the cautious nature of EU democracy promotion, the avoidance of con-
ditionalities, and the focus on less controversial forms of assistance to civil society.8 Echo-
ing this conclusion, the EU position in Morocco is neatly summed up by Dorothée Schmid: 
“[the EU’s] role seems to be presently limited to a field of action designed by the Moroccan 
officials themselves. The EU has no choice other than to praise Moroccan independent ini-
tiatives and push their logic to the extreme, hoping that it could finally trigger substantial 
change”.9 In a similar vein, a number of studies comparing US and EU assistance to MENA 
countries identify the following main differences: the US’ more bottom-up approach, as 
compared to the rather state-centred EU, the EU avoidance of assisting political parties, 
and a greater institutionalization of EU policies.10 There have also been differences regard-
ing the inclusion of Islamists: while Europeans consider them, to borrow Richard Young’s 
words, the “untouchables of the democracy assistance world”,11 they have been included 
in a number of US projects, not least in Morocco. As Boube�eur and Amghar note, US re-
lations are “particularly advanced with the Moroccan Islamist party, the PJD [Justice and 
Development Party]” as the prospects of a PJD success at the polls in 2007 “prompted the 
US to support the PJD in the wa�e of the [Casablanca terrorist] attac�s of 16 May 2003, 
whereas Moroccan political leaders have called for it to be disbanded”.12 
Lin�ed to this is the issue of the effectiveness and consistency of democracy promoting 
policies. A common argument in the vast literature devoted to this question13 is that de-
mocracy promotion has been less effective than was hoped,14 a conclusion also valid for the 
MENA region. In a 2002 survey of democracy promotion in North Africa, Richard �illespie 
and Laurence Whitehead noted that “less than a decade after the European Union started 
to extend its democracy promotion efforts to its southern neighbours, there are few if any 
signs of many tangible results”.15 Similarly, Richard Youngs claims that “the European Un-
ion’s efforts to promote political reform in North Africa and the Middle East are running into 
the ground” because it is pursuing “a scatter-gun approach that supports ad hoc initia-
tives, rather than a coherent strategy for political reform, and a failure to support independ-
ent and socially-rooted reformers on the ground”.16 Analyses of post 9/11 US initiatives 
are no more enthusiastic.17 With regards to Morocco specifically, observers basically reach 
the same conclusion: democracy promotion has only been marginally effective, not least 
1.
 Analysing 
democracy
promotion in the 
MENA region:
A focus 
on the donors
3 Aliboni, 2004; Haddadi, 2004; Schmid and Braizat, 
2006; Youngs, 2004.
4 Carothers and Ottaway, 2005; Carothers, 2003; 
Coo�, 2005.
5 The classical account in this vein is written by Rob-
inson (1996).
6 Benjelloun, 2007; Hasbi, 2008, pp. 50-51. Other ac-
counts, in contrast, explain the surge in conditionality 
and donor demands for democracy as the combined re-
sult of the end of the Cold War (which made third world 
allies redundant and thus made it easier to be “tough” 
on poorer states) and the increasing “aid fatigue” in 
rich countries, with concomitant demands from the 
public for better control and use of aid money (Nelson 
and Eglinton, 1993; Moore and Robinson, 1994). The 
bac�drop to this is the argument that democracy, or 
at least good governance, is a precondition for the ef-
fective use of aid money, and hence for development. 
Yet for others, many of whom writing from a neo-con-
servative perspective, democracy promotion is simply 
a natural and constant part of US foreign policy in par-
ticular (Muravchi�, 1991; Smith 1994).
7 Carnegie Endowment (undated). A detailed global 
equivalent covering European political foundations 
has been maintained by the Dutch Clingendael Insti-
tute (van Wersch, Jos and Jeroen de Zeeuw, 2005).
8 Youngs, 2002, 2004, and 2005. These findings are 
echoed elsewhere, see for example Warning, 2006, 
p.48; �ausch, 2008; Schmid, 2006b.
9 Schmid, 2006b, p.26. See also Mal�a and Altermann,         
2006; �ausch 2008b. Other studies focus more spe-    
cifically on a particular type of democracy assistance, 
such as assistance to human rights N�Os, to the judi-
ciary or to the media. Thus for example, in a thought-
ful article by Naomi Sa�r, after comparing different 
international and regional funders and initiatives in 
the area of media freedom in the MENA region, Sa�r 
concludes that “de-politisation”, top-down agenda-
setting and N�O fragmentation are not, as previously 
feared, necessary consequences of international fund-
ing (Sa�r, 2006).
10 Boube�eur and Amghar, 2006; Huber, 2008; Stahn 
and van Hüllen, 2007; Ammor, 2005.
11 Youngs, 2004, p.12.
12 Boube�eur and Amghar, 2006, p.24. See also Sharp, 
2006; Yacoubian, 2007.
13 A review by �ordon Crawford and Iain �earton from 
2002 counted no less than 110 donor evaluations of 
the effectiveness of democracy assistance, and this, 
of course, still leaves out the substantial amount of 
academic writing on the topic (Crawford and �earton, 
2002, p. iv).
14 However, methodological difficulties in measuring 
effectiveness should not be underestimated (see, for 
example, Burnell, 2007 (Ed.).
15 �illespie and Whitehead, 2002, p.192. For a much 
more sanguine assessment, see Campbell, 2007, who 
claims (p.65) that “Far from being a failure, the policy 
of assisting democracy in the Middle East is starting to 
show remar�able dividends”.
16 Youngs, 2006, pp. 1-2. For a similar conclusion, see 
Albioni, 2005, p.48.
17 United States �overnment Accountability Office 
(2005).
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because of insufficient incentives for reform. Martina Warning, for example, compares EU 
democracy promotion in Morocco and Tur�ey and concludes that Tur�ey’s prospect of EU 
membership has made a tremendous difference: “it must finally be conceded that the ENP 
[European Neighbourhood Policy, see section 2 for further discussion of this policy] as a 
diet version of enlargement simply cannot taste as good as the original”.18
When the issue of consistency is examined, the conclusion is almost invariably the same: 
there is little of it. In some states, the West vigorously promotes democracy, while in other 
equally undemocratic countries the issue is hardly on the table. Even in those countries 
where democracy is promoted, the policies of promoting states do not always consistently 
favour democracy.19 This is perhaps particularly true within the MENA region, where West-
ern countries have generally tended to favour undemocratic but “stable” regimes over dem-
ocratic but potentially unstable ones.20 Certain authors even claim that the “hidden agenda 
of the Barcelona Process” is to reinforce authoritarian regimes in the Mediterranean for the 
sa�e of regional stability.21 In the wa�e of 11 September 2001, the tension between long-
term stability – often seen as most successfully furthered through democratisation – and 
short-term security concerns has often been solved at the expense of democratisation. 
Contradictions become particularly glaring at times. For example, the EU stresses human 
rights in its relations with Morocco, while simultaneously pressurizing it to crac� down on 
migrants and combat terrorism, both of which are “li�ely to have negative consequences in 
terms of human rights”.22 Some see these contradictions as a consequence of the position 
of certain EU member states, such as France and Spain, which have long-standing contacts 
with the Moroccan ruling elite and a strong interest in border control.23 In a study focusing 
specifically on Spanish democracy promotion in Morocco, Laura Feliu succinctly sums up 
the problem of inconsistency: “Can it be effective to invest in reform of the judiciary if one 
fails to condemn specific cases of unfair trials? Can one collaborate with the independent 
press if one fails to protest when publications are banned or when a retrogressive press 
code is passed? Is it coherent policy to finance feminist associations while remaining silent 
about the reform of the Mudawana?”24
Most analysts argue that democracy promotion is particularly difficult in the Arab world. 
The title of texts attempting to tac�le the challenges faced by Western countries seem to 
spea� for themselves: “Uncharted Journey: Promoting Democracy in the Middle East”; 
“The Wrong Way to Sell Democracy to the Arab World”; and “The Right Way to Promote 
Arab Reform”.25 Among the core themes invariably addressed are the difficulties in foster-
ing democracy in a region where there is a long tradition of authoritarian rule and where 
the regimes in power have very limited, if any, interest in significant political liberalisation. 
Another important challenge discussed is the strong and – since the US-led invasion of Iraq 
– growing suspicion and distrust as regards Western countries (and in particular the US). 
In the Arab world, many wonder what the “true” objectives and hidden agendas behind 
Western democracy promotion efforts are.26
It is particularly this latter issue, of the credibility and legitimacy of Western countries’ 
democracy promotion activities in the MENA region, which lies at the heart of this study. 
While there seems to be general agreement that Western – and in particular US – cred-
ibility is indeed a problem, no systematic study has thus far been underta�en to assess 
how democracy promotion is perceived in the MENA region. There have, of course, been a 
number of surveys underta�en in the region examining the credibility of the US, in general, 
as a promoter of political reform, all of which invariably point to its lac� of credibility.27 
Several analysts note that Arab leaders tend to be – at best – very lu�ewarm towards this 
type of assistance and often see the purported Arab-Western partnerships as one-sided. A 
number of analysts have also detected a so-called bac�lash against democracy promotion, 
whereby some Arab political leaders actively pursue domestic groups and individuals for 
having obtained foreign funds and attempt to discredit Western democracy promotion in 
the eyes of the public.28 A few studies include a passing mention of the perceptions among 
those at the receiving end of democracy promotion policies.29 However, no specific and de-
tailed analysis of how different democracy promotion activities, and of how different donor 
countries and organizations are perceived by both recipients and would-be recipients, has 
thus far been carried out. The present study represents a first step in filling this gap in the 
literature, focusing on the case of Morocco. In order to ma�e more general conclusions, 
research would obviously have to be extended to other countries in the region.
18 Warning, 2006, p.51; see also Maalmi, 2008, pp.70-
76.
19 Piccone and Youngs (Eds.) 2006; Uvin, 1993.
20 �illespie and Whitehead, 2002; Haddadi, 2002; 
Hänggi and Tanner, 2005.
21 Béatrice Hibou and Luis Martinez, cited in Dorothé 
Schmid, 2003.
22 Schmid, cited in Warning, p.40.
23 Wegner, 2007; Feliu 2003.
24 Feliu, 2003, p.105.
25 Brzezins�i, 2004; Carothers and Ottaway, 2005; 
Coo�, 2005.
26 Mal�a and Alterman, 2006, pp.19-21.
27 Benjelloun, 2007; Ottaway, 2003; De Bartolo, 
2008.
28 Carothers, 2006; �ershman and Allen, 2006. For 
specific instances of Middle Eastern government re-
pression of international governance assistance wor�, 
see Campbell, 2007, and National Endowment for De-
mocracy, 2006, p.7, 30. It must be stressed that the 
bac�lash against democracy promotion is not solely 
an Arab phenomenon: it is equally present in states 
such as Russia, China and Zimbabwe.
29 Boube�eur and Amghar, 2006, pp.21, 24-25; Mal�a 
and Alterman, 2006, p.20; Schmid and Braizat, 2006, 
pp.16-17, 22; Reinhardt, 2002, pp.15-16; Youngs, 2006, 
p.5; �ausch, 2007, p.11.
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Among the MENA states, Morocco has been a �ey target of Western democracy promotion 
efforts in recent years. The main reason for this is that it is often perceived as one of the 
most liberal and progressive countries in the region, and hence as an important test case 
for democracy. This might seem paradoxical, given that the country is a monarchy where 
the �ing – apart from being the head of state, with vast powers over the executive, the 
judiciary, and the legislature – is the commander-in-chief of the armed forces, has control 
of vast swaths of the economy, and, being considered a direct descendent of the Prophet 
Muhammad, is also Commander of the Faithful.
Moreover, important civil and political rights are only partially guaranteed in the monarchy. 
Media freedom (especially in its electronic forms) and the freedom of association are re-
stricted. Elections are held under conditions of apathy – in the 2007 elections, some 63% 
of the electorate stayed home and 19% of those who actually voted cast a blan� or invalid 
ballot – and the party system is dysfunctional. This, in turn, is a consequence of constitu-
tional and practical arrangements that render the legislature toothless and fragment politi-
cal parties. Perhaps most importantly, the power of the makhzen (the name given to the 
ruling elite surrounding the �ing) has not been affected by the reforms.30
Progress was achieved in some areas under the late �ing Hassan II. The most important 
include the constitutional reforms of 1996, which led to the creation of a Chamber of Repre-
sentatives directly elected by universal suffrage, the prohibition of torture, and the begin-
nings of the gouvernement d’alternance, allowing, for the first time, opposition parties to 
participate in the government (yet ministerial appointments were, and still are, subject to 
approval by the �ing). Nevertheless, �ing Hassan II’s decades of heavy authoritarian rule 
during the années de plomb (“the years of lead”) cast a shadow over these late reforms.
The new �ing Muhammad VI has, albeit tentatively, continued on the path of reform, brea�-
ing with some of his father’s legacies. He ordered, for instance, the establishment of the 
Equity and Reconciliation Commission to investigate repression during his father’s reign. 
Perhaps the most notable reform has been the revamping of the Mudawana, the personal 
status code, to strengthen the position of Moroccan women in matters of guardianship, 
marriage, divorce, etc.31 Other reforms include an ease of controls on the written press 
(which has led newspaper reporting to become the most vibrant in the region), increased 
recognition of Amazigh (Berber) rights, and a reinforcement of the torture ban. Moreover, 
decentralization and the empowerment of local communities have been pursued through 
the National Human Development Initiative, and the integration of moderate Islamists into 
the official political arena has led to a somewhat more open political climate. It is due to 
measures such as these that Morocco is seen by Western states as the most promising 
Arab candidate for reform.
Morocco receives democracy assistance from the European Union and, to a lesser extent, 
from individual EU governments such as �ermany, France, and Spain. The United States 
and Canada also provide Morocco with democracy support. Western N�Os are active in 
the area as well. In addition to democracy assistance, the respect for democratic principles 
is a �ey element of the main agreements and initiatives between Morocco and Western 
states, such as those developed under the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership and the Eu-
ropean Neighbourhood Policy. This section surveys Western democracy promotion efforts 
and provides information on their institutional underpinnings.32
The history of EU-Moroccan relations dates bac� to the days of the European Economic 
Community, and Morocco is the Mediterranean country that has traditionally had the closest 
ties to the European Union.33 Today, the EU’s promotion of democracy and good governance 
is part of a dense institutional framewor�, including the multilateral Euro-Mediterranean 
Partnership (EMP, also termed the Barcelona Process), underpinned by bilateral associa-
tion agreements; the mainly bilateral European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP), launched in 
2004 and implemented with the help of action plans; and financial instruments such as the 
European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument (ENPI) and the European Instrument 
on Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR). The European Union has stressed democrati-
zation in a number of other contexts as well: namely, the Euro-Mediterranean Ministerial 
meetings, European Commission Communications, the European Consensus on Develop-
ment, ENP progress reports on Morocco, etc.34
The Barcelona Declaration of 1995 stresses the promotion of democracy and human rights, 
and the EMP association agreements all include a conditionality clause committing the 
partner countries to respect democratic principles and human rights (common Article 2).35 
2.
 Western democracy 
promotion activities 
in Morocco to date: 
A brief overview
Introduction
EU democracy promotion 
in Morocco
30 For commentaries and analyses of the 2007 elec-
tions, see for example, Democracy Reporting Interna-
tional and Transparency Maroc, 2007; �ausch, 2007; 
and Storm, 2008.  For a review of the reforms and their 
limits over the last decades, see Naciri et al., 2004; 
Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2007; Carnegie Endowment 
and FRIDE, 2007.
31 For details on this reform, see Naciri et al., 2004,           
pp.27-31.
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This clause has, however, never been applied towards any Mediterranean partner country 
to date. The emphasis in the agreements – and the EU/Moroccan association agreement is 
no exception in this respect – is instead squarely on trade and economic cooperation, with 
democracy and human rights remaining on the sidelines. The rationale behind this is that 
economic liberalization will eventually spill over to the political domain.
The ENP, launched in 2004, follows an “enlargement logic” by which partner states, depend-
ing on their progress, are offered access to the EU’s single mar�et and closer ties with the 
EU, without, however, any prospect of EU membership. It thus uses positive conditionalities, 
whereby political, economic, and institutional reforms are rewarded with closer economic in-
tegration with the European Union. The ENP action plans have a stronger governance compo-
nent than the EMP association agreements. The EU/Morocco action plan therefore includes 
some elements on “Democracy and the Rule of Law”, mainly focused on administrative capac-
ity, decentralisation, corruption and reform in the justice sector. Moreover, under the heading 
“Human rights and fundamental freedoms”, action points regarding the implementation of 
the law on freedom of association and of assembly, and also of the law liberalising the au-
diovisual sector are to be noted.36 Yet the main emphasis is on administrative reform, and the 
concomitant fiscal, auditing, and legal reform requirements suggest that “the EU at this level 
is more intrusive than the United States”, according to one observer.37 The ENP includes no 
funding scheme; instead, the EU commits to providing “substantial financial support via an 
appropriate range of financial instruments” in order to meet the Action Plan objectives.38 
The European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument (ENPI, under which the former 
MEDA has been subsumed) is the main funding instrument of the EMP and the ENP. Thus, it 
is through the ENPI 2007-2010 National Indicative Programme that the EU-Moroccan asso-
ciation agreement and action plan are translated into concrete programmes. “�overnance 
and Human Rights” receives EUR 28 million for 2007-2010, approximately 4% of the total, 
and “Institutional Support” receives another EUR 40 million. Prison reform and the training 
of court staff in the new Mudawana legislation, as well as legislation on minors, are the two 
poles of governance support. Human rights in Morocco is supported through the creation 
of a Moroccan institute of contemporary history to house, amongst other materials, the 
documents from the Equity and Reconciliation Commission (for more on that institution, 
see introduction to this section), an improved archive, and a history museum.39 Morocco 
was also one of the first ENP states to receive funding (of EUR 28 million) through the ENP 
�overnance Facility in 2007, as a reward for its commitment to political reform. These funds 
are being used to reinforce on-going reforms of the public administration.
The European Instrument on Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR) is the specialized EU 
fund for governance and human rights-related projects in developing and transition coun-
tries. It is institutionally separate from the EMP and the ENP and mainly targets civil so-
ciety. Over the last half-decade, allocations to Morocco have amounted to approximately 
EUR 1 million annually.40 Support has been provided to N�Os active in a number of areas: 
namely, election observation; journalists’ education and training; judicial reform; civil soci-
ety support structures; youth; human rights (including women’s rights and torture victims); 
women’s participation in politics; wor� with street children and wor�ing children; etc.41
The old colonial master, France, is the largest of all donors (both bilaterally and multilater-
ally) in Morocco. France does not, however, have a strong tradition of democracy promotion 
abroad, and is often pin-pointed as the most reluctant of all EU states when it comes to 
democracy promotion in the Arab world in general, and in Morocco in particular.42 Yet in the 
Moroccan context, governance – if not democratization – is nevertheless one of four “trans-
versal intervention areas” of the Service de Coopération et d’Action Culturelle (SCAC).43 The 
governance dimension encompasses modernisation of the civil service, justice, internal 
security, civil protection, decentralisation, and urban planning, and includes a project on 
youth participation in public life.44 France also supports N�Os, mainly those wor�ing in 
social areas, but also human rights N�Os.45 EUR 25-30 million have been allocated for gov-
ernance-related wor� during 2006-2010. The lion’s share (approximately EUR 22 million) is 
devoted to institutional support, and another EUR 3.7 million to civil protection and the po-
lice. The remaining funds go to N�Os wor�ing in the social sector, and to other governance 
projects.46 However, as Dorothée Schmid notes regarding French governance assistance to 
Morocco, “Some officials would even ac�nowledge that the contents of some programmes 
and projects can be easily re-qualified in order to fit the “governance, democracy and hu-
man rights” category and satisfy the present collective preference for [democratic] reform, 
while no major re-orientation has ta�en place.”47
Post-colonial ties and 
new linkages: European 
states promoting 
democracy in Morocco
32 UN efforts fall outside the scope of this report, 
seeing as they cannot be labelled “Western”. They 
were also scarcely mentioned by interviewees for 
this study. The UNDP’s wor� on governance in the 
MENA region, through its Arab Human Development 
reports, has received great attention. Its Programme 
on �overnance in the Arab Region (PO�AR), focused 
on capacity building, dialogue and policy advice in 
the areas of rule of law, participation, and transpar-
ency and accountability, is informed by the analysis 
in those reports. In Morocco, PO�AR is complemented 
by bilateral wor�, underta�en jointly with a number of 
other UN agencies. One of the three main focus areas 
for the period 2007-2011 is “reinforcing capacities for 
democratic governance”, with a focus on decentraliza-
tion, and the issue of human rights and gender should 
permeate all programming in the country (UNDP, 
2006, p.4). The resources allocated for the entire 
five-year period amount to USD 5.9 million for gender 
mainstreaming and USD 14.5 million for decentralisa-
tion and public participation (UNDP, 2006, Annexe 2; 
see also UNDAF, 2006).
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Li�e France, Spain has traditionally put rather limited emphasis on democracy promotion 
in its development policies, particularly in the MENA region. Since the Socialists came into 
power with the 2004 general elections, this has changed however.48 Morocco, an ex-colony, 
is one of the 23 priority countries for Spanish development assistance, and in relation to 
Morocco, democratic governance is one of four priority sectors. In 2004-2006, a yearly av-
erage of EUR 4.5 million was earmar�ed for “government and civil society” programmes be-
ing developed in Morocco.49 The target areas identified for the period 2005-2008 were the 
reinforcement of social dialogue, civil society empowerment, rule of law, and decentraliza-
tion. A large part of the assistance provided is decentralized out to the Moroccan regions 
and channelled through N�Os.50
Germany traditionally leaves democracy promotion to its political foundations, which are 
lin�ed to the �erman political parties and funded through the Bundestag. Four of �er-
many’s six political foundations are active in Morocco, i.e. the Friedrich Ebert Foundation 
(FES), the �onrad Adenauer Foundation (�AS), the Friedrich Naumann Foundation (FNS), 
and the Hanns Seidel Foundation (HSS).51 All have a slightly different focus, reflecting their 
respective ideological bac�grounds: FES centres its wor� on economic development and 
the promotion of women’s and human rights N�Os; FNS supports economic development 
and the training and education of journalists; and HSS see�s to promote the rule of law and 
administrative reform. At the MENA-wide level, �AS is engaged in election monitoring,52 
but in Morocco, the focus is on the development of the social sciences and the humanities 
– and as such, wor� that is not directly relevant for democracy promotion.53 These �erman 
foundations wor� primarily with civil society actors.
Other EU states have provided support for individual initiatives and projects mostly as part 
of regional programmes.
Until recently, Morocco was rather peripheral to US interests, although it has always been 
a staunch ally with close ties to NATO. US attention was instead centred on Israel and its 
neighbours, and on the oil-rich �ulf. However, this has changed, most notably after 11 
September 2001. The US is now active in Morocco through a number of avenues. Funding 
comes mainly from the Middle East Partnership Initiative (MEPI), USAID, and the Bureau 
of Democracy, Human Rights and Labour (DRL). Important implementing agencies include 
the main quasi-governmental organisations:54 the National Democratic Institute for Inter-
national Affairs (NDI), the International Republican Institute (IRI), and the National Endow-
ment for Democracy (NED).
The main post-9/11 US initiative in the MENA region is the Middle East Partnership Initiative 
(MEPI). Launched in 2002, it offers support for political, economic and educational reforms 
and has had Dic� Cheney’s daughter Elizabeth at its helm since the outset.55 MEPI’s pres-
ence is largest in Morocco,56 where programmes have targeted – apart from a range of re-
gion-wide activities (which have encompassed several media-related projects) –parliamen-
tary reforms, support to political parties, and the strengthening of local government.57
USAID also provides democracy assistance, and increasingly so since 11 September 
2001. In Morocco, USAID has wor�ed on technical assistance and training for the Mo-
roccan parliament, with the aim of strengthening the parliament’s capacity to oversee 
public finances, review legislation and policy, and engage in a dialogue with its citizens. 
It has also attempted to encourage citizen participation in local decision-ma�ing, es-
pecially in relation to low-income housing needs. In view of the 2007 elections, USAID 
commissioned NDI and IRI to wor� with Moroccan political parties, including the mod-
erate Islamist party PJD, to improve their capacity to develop politically viable policy 
positions and to effectively communicate those same positions to voters. NDI also as-
sisted Moroccan civil society in ensuring voter participation in the elections, and has 
conducted a large number of focus groups (a particular type of polling technique) to 
gauge Moroccan public opinion.58
Lastly, the Human Rights and Democracy Initiative (HRDF) of the Bureau of Democracy 
– Human Rights and Labor (DRL) – funds some MENA-wide projects (on general democracy 
issues, media, women etc.) that have included Morocco. It has also funded judicial reform 
projects in Morocco.
To complete the picture, The Broader Middle East and North Africa Initiative (BMENA), 
in principle a joint US-European initiative strongly advocated by the US and launched 
at a �-8 summit in mid-2004, must be mentioned. BMENA aims to support Middle East-
Newly found interest: 
US democracy promotion
in Morocco
33 For a succinct overview of the history of EU-Moroc-
can relations, see Warning, 2006, pp.5-6.
34 See for example: “Reinvigorating EU actions on Hu-
man Rights and democratisation with Mediterranean 
partners: Strategic �uidelines”, Brussels, 21.05.2003, 
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and the European Parliament, COM(2003) 294 final; 
“The European Consensus on Development”, Joint 
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35 A thorough review of the EMP is provided in 
Schmid, 2006b, chapter 1.
36 European Union/Morocco, 2005. For a critique of 
the Action Plan, see �ausch, 2008.
37 Youngs, 2008, p.166.
38 European Union/Morocco, 2005, “Introduction”.
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eting, internal audits, evaluation and performance 
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49 Zulueta Fülscher, 2008, pp.8-9; Ministry of Foreign 
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50 Spanish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2007, p.29.
51 The newest of these Stiftungen, the Rosa Luxem-
burg Foundation – founded in 1996 and affiliated to 
the post DDR-Party of Democratic Socialism – is not 
active in Morocco. The Heinrich Böll Foundation (�reen 
Party) disbanded its Moroccan activities (which mainly 
assisted N�Os see�ing to promote women’s rights and 
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ern reform in the political, social, and economic domains. With the main emphasis be-
ing on better coordination, its ambitions are relatively modest. However, the political 
part of the initiative is also implemented through a Forum and a Foundation the Future. 
The yearly Forum for the Future, the first of which was held in Morocco in 2004, brings 
together government, business and civil society leaders. Due to conflicting views on 
how to further reforms, no meeting has been held since 2006, however. The Founda-
tion for the Future is intended to provide assistance to civil society organisations that 
wor� to foster democracy and freedom in the Broader Middle East and North Africa. 
The Foundation is based in Amman since 2008, and started its grant-giving activities in 
2007. So far, it only has limited activities in Morocco, and is thus of marginal interest 
to this study.
Some American initiatives have been very high profile. The US’ wor� with the Moroccan 
parliament and political parties, as described above, is among these. Another project 
that has received extensive attention is the two opinion polls underta�en by the IRI in 
the wa�e of the 2007 elections, not least because polling had not until then been part 
of the political landscape in Morocco. The polls predicted that PJD had a following of 
approximately half the electorate, which would have entailed an upheaval of the Moroc-
can political landscape. The American ambassador’s official show of support for Nadia 
Yassine, a leader of the officially prohibited Al‘Adl wal-Ihsan (Justice and Spirituality) 
movement, when she was detained in 2005 for publicly declaring that she would prefer 
Morocco to be a republic rather than a monarchy, was also widely noted. Another note-
worthy initiative was the participation in a meeting organised by the PJD in spring 2006 
on “American Decision-Ma�ing and its Impact on Moroccan-American Relations”, which 
brought together American politicians and Moroccan Islamists from the PJD party, with 
the aim of exploring outlets in the US decision-ma�ing processes for the expression of 
PJD opinions.59
Morocco is the largest recipient of Canadian development assistance in the Maghreb re-
gion, and a priority area of that assistance is governance.60 Thus, one of three priorities for 
the intervention of ACDI, the Canadian development agency, is “citizen participation”, and 
one of the three target partners is civil society.61 Citizen participation is translated into pro-
grammes on gender equality, reinforcing the dialogue between the state and civil society, 
decentralisation, and participatory development.62 Projects have included support for de-
centralising the education sector and improving local government in the north of Morocco. 
Many projects have a regional focus (encompassing the Francophonie or the entire Arab 
world).63 Canadians have mostly wor�ed through Moroccan associations, targeting smaller, 
less high-profile N�Os.64
The line between Western state and Western N�O-financed democracy assistance is 
sometimes blurred. As we have seen in the American case, quasi-governmental organisa-
tions are �ey to democracy promotion policies. Similarly, the �erman foundations, while 
entirely autonomous from political interference, are fully funded by the �erman state. In 
other cases, Western states are partial funders, or together provide the bul� of funds for 
Western N�Os.
N�Os with a sustained presence in Morocco (and a mixed funding base) include Oxfam-
Novib (Netherlands), which wor�s on a number of projects directed towards what it labels 
as “the right to be heard”, and Oxfam Québec, active in human and women’s rights.
US civil society has been active in exchanges and programmes with Moroccan organisa-
tions. The Ford Foundation has a long-established programme in the Middle East and North 
Africa, run from Cairo. Its current focus is on Egypt and the Palestinian territories, however. 
The Open Society/Soros Foundations programming in the region, by contrast, is recent. 
Smaller American N�Os present in Morocco include the Open Budget Initiative. Similarly 
to the US government, US civil society actors also encompass Moroccan religious parties 
in their programming. Thus, for example, Nadia Yassine was invited by the University of 
California Ber�eley for a tour of the US, which included stops at Harvard and other top-
universities.65 An American thin� tan�, the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 
invited the PJD in May 2006 to spea� on the subject: “An Islamic party faces the challenges 
of democracy and development”.66 
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International election 
observation
67 The reason for choosing an American-led effort 
was, on the one hand, that NDI had previous experi-
ence wor�ing with the Moroccan parliament and its 
political parties and, on the other, that the Moroccan 
decision to allow international monitors came very 
late: an EU or OSCE mission would have ta�en longer 
to organize (interviews, Rabat, 6-12 June 2008).
68 National Democratic Institute (2007).
69 National Democratic Institute (2007). This can 
be compared with Le Collectif Associatif pour 
l’Observation des Elections (2007).
While there was no international observer mission present during the 2002 parliamentary 
elections in Morocco, domestic observers were allowed to monitor the poll for the first 
time. In view of the 2007 elections, the Moroccan authorities too� an additional step by 
inviting an international observation mission headed by the NDI, to the country.67 The 50-
person strong delegation was composed of legislators, former government ministers and 
ambassadors, civic leaders, as well as specialists on the region, and on elections and hu-
man rights, from 20 countries around the globe. This delegation was preceded by a pre-
election assessment team. The delegates visited polling stations in selected locations.68 
Domestic and international observers concurred that the 2007 elections were the most 
transparent and fair in the history of Morocco, as “overall, the voting went smoothly and 
was characterized by a spirit of transparency and professionalism”. However, the mission 
stressed that “the low voter turnout... and significant number of protest votes suggest that 
Moroccan authorities will need to underta�e further political reforms in order to encourage 
widespread engagement in the political process. Those reforms should aim to enhance the 
power of elected representatives, while also increasing the transparency of the system and 
accountability to the electorate”.69
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How then, are the various programmes, projects, and initiatives here outlined perceived in 
Morocco? This section examines the issue in detail, starting with the official Moroccan po-
sition and views within the state sector. It then moves on to examine Moroccan N�Os’, po-
litical parties’, and media representatives’ often well-reasoned positions vis-à-vis foreign 
donors and initiatives. Perceptions pertaining specifically to US and European democracy 
promotion respectively are treated under the two subsequent headings. Lastly, Moroccan 
views of Western civil society actors and the international election observation mission of 
2007 are briefly discussed.
The report centres on the perceptions of people who are directly or indirectly targeted by 
democracy promotion efforts and often, through their activities, help translate these into 
actions on the ground. It is based on a wide range of in-depth interviews with �ey repre-
sentatives of the parliament, civil society organizations, as well as organizations sponsored 
by the state, political parties, the judiciary, media, and the academic world. The reason for 
this focus, rather than examining perceptions of the population at large, is the unli�ely-
hood that a large share of the public has any opinion on what is a rather narrow set of 
specific policies. While it ma�es sense to question the general public, through quantitative 
surveys, broader research into their ideas about democracy and impediments to democra-
tization in their country, or about particular democracy-promoting policies and actors, their 
legitimacy and credibility, would ris� being too specific, and thus producing poor results. 
Centring solely on political leaders is also less fruitful, given that their formal position is 
often already �nown (see section 1). As a result of this focus on organizations and individu-
als who are direct or indirect targets of democracy assistance, the perceptions discussed 
in this report most often concern the specific activities and programmes of Western states, 
rather than the larger existing policy framewor�s (i.e. the EMP, ENP, MEPI, etc.).
Many Arab governments, including some that are close allies to the West in general and 
to the US in particular, play on their people’s ambivalence towards the West. The Egyptian 
government has, for instance, at times prompted imams from leading mosques to attac� 
prominent democrats and human rights activists accepting foreign (and in particular Amer-
ican) funds, accusing them of being “traitors” supporting an “American infidel idea”.70 In 
contrast, Moroccan governments, even when faced with N�Os that have defied their poli-
cies, have refrained from playing the “traitor” card. This was also true under the reign of 
Hassan II, his restrictions on N�Os and political activities notwithstanding.71 
Under Mohammed VI, the law on associations was altered (in 2002) so as to ma�e it easier 
for N�Os to see� and accept foreign funds.72 The main reason for this was that N�Os pro-
vide important social services that the government could not guarantee, and these N�Os 
could not function and grow without foreign funding. However, not only social service N�Os 
benefited from the easing of regulations, but also advocacy organisations. The main con-
trol mechanism on foreign resources is the need to notify the government of the receipt of 
any such funding within thirty days, otherwise the association may ris� being dissolved.73 
The Moroccan government has therefore not attempted to discredit N�Os by using the 
argument of foreign funding. Instead, it has employed a strategy of co-option of civil soci-
ety by cooperating with and incorporating national N�O elites into government service.74 
According to interviewees, the “traitor” argument would in any event not wor� in Morocco, 
for two main reasons. Firstly, the Moroccan government itself ma�es use of foreign aid for 
a variety of purposes, and even set up quasi-N�Os in the 1980s in order to tap into inter-
national donors’ new strategy of funding civil society organisations.75 Secondly, Moroccan 
political parties and N�Os are part of a long tradition of opposition and contestation, and 
they cannot, therefore, easily be accused of being foreign implants or lac�eys.76
In 2006, the Moroccan Ministry of Foreign Affairs reportedly sent a note to foreign embas-
sies in Rabat reminding them of their obligations when assisting Moroccan associations. 
This note was mentioned with some astonishment by several interviewees, particularly 
given that the note was never made official, nor was it – as far as is �nown –followed up 
with any other action. Some observers have speculated that the government’s concern with 
funding for terrorism or for groups close to the Polisario Front were the main reasons be-
hind the note. The note is perceived as an isolated event, not affecting the government’s 
generally liberal approach. The palace has also reportedly been rattled by specific democ-
racy promotion policies on other occasions (see, for example, the IRI opinion poll affair 
detailed below), but official reactions have not targeted democracy promotion or N�O re-
ception of foreign funds per se.77
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NGO, political party, 
and media strategies 
and positions towards 
democracy promotion
Political parties and media outlets, in contrast to N�Os, are not entitled to receive money 
from foreign sources under Moroccan law. They can participate in training and exchanges of 
views, however. The rules are rather supple, so that, for example, the editor-in-chief of the 
main Arab-language Islamist publication, Al-Tajdid, and other journalists have been admit-
ted to study at American universities and to follow training courses at the US Congress. 
Although the freest in the MENA region, Moroccan print media are subject to regular harass-
ment and court procedures implying closures and even imprisonment, mainly for overstep-
ping les lignes rouges, the “red lines” delimiting what can be said, in particular about the 
�ing. But here again, the “foreign influences card” is not used by authorities in such cases. 
The press are also careful not to overstep legal boundaries concerning foreign funding.78
The Moroccan judiciary has been one of the main target areas of recent Western reform ef-
forts (although exchanges, especially with France and the European-level courts, are noth-
ing new, but rather date bac� to the 1960s)79. When Western judicial reform efforts are 
mentioned to people wor�ing in the judiciary, similar arguments as those used by Moroc-
can N�Os (see below) are advanced: Morocco has a strong legal tradition and experience 
which is not affected; it has no inferiority complex vis-à-vis any other state; programmes 
are designed in accordance with Moroccan demands; and everything is done in the open.80 
Special Western emphasis has been put on rather sensitive issues, such as the effective 
implementation of the new Mudawana – a reform that has been resisted by conservative 
members of the judiciary. Again, it is agreed that members of the judiciary have not had 
any problems with the foreign training or other programmes: the problems have been with 
the Mudawana, not with foreign-sponsored initiatives regarding its implementation. In any 
event, members of the judiciary are obliged by law not to comment on political decisions, 
and once the �ing had decided on the Mudawana “everyone shut up”, as one member of 
the judiciary put it off the record.
In contrast to many N�Os, the foundations under royal – and, by extension, state – patron-
age, rely mainly on domestic sources of funding. Thus, the Fondation Mohammed V pour 
la Solidarité, the royal foundation with the largest remit, relies on its general fundraising 
campaign held every November, to which all Moroccans are expected to contribute in ac-
cordance to their means. Funds also stem from sales of stamps and badges, private ben-
efactors, and partnerships with and support from Moroccan firms. The foundation does not 
receive any funding from abroad, although it has seen funding offers from various countries 
in Europe and the Arab world.81 According to a representative of the foundation, this is 
because, technically, the foundation is not ready to open up to foreign funding; although, 
he was quic� to stress, at the political level, it would pose no problem. The reliance on do-
mestic funding is also a consequence of the solidarity principle purportedly at the basis of 
the foundation, which implies reciprocity between Moroccans.82
None of the persons interviewed for this study could identify an N�O that would outright 
refuse Western funds or cooperation with the West. This reflects the double reality of Mo-
roccan civil society: the scarcity of domestic funding, particularly for secular N�Os, on the 
one hand, and on the other, the great pragmatism of all significant Moroccan N�Os, from 
Islamists to feminists. Pragmatism is not confined to N�Os: political parties and MPs, from 
the religious PJD right across to the secular left, all participate in programmes proposed by 
various Western actors.83
Moroccan pragmatism could be summarized as follows: as long as partners in the West do 
not interfere in defining goals, programmes, or activities, if there is transparency on both 
sides, and if the Moroccan actor has a strong identity, sense of direction and possibility 
to diversify funding, there is no problem with accepting money from Western sources, as 
long as these are themselves democratic. Nous n’avons pas de complexes is a phrase that 
comes up over and again. “What’s important is not the financing, but rather the human re-
sources, transparency, competence, and programming” stresses one PJD parliamentarian 
who is also heading a women’s N�O.84 
Pragmatism also includes recognition of the political nature of assistance in all instances. 
“All states further their own interests” is a common observation from N�Os, parliamentar-
ians, and party officials. It is up to Moroccan actors to read and understand these interests, 
and see if and how they can maintain their identity and autonomy within these parameters. 
Recognition of the political motives of Western democracy promotion has also, in the Mo-
roccan case, implied a critical analysis of its contradictions and inconsistencies, without 
resorting to “CIA spotting” and conspiracy theories. “Loo�ing for conspiracies is a thing of 
the Mashreq, not the Maghreb” smiled one observer.85 A discussion summary from 2000, 
78 See, for example, Syndicat National de la Presse 
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prepared by the Espace associatif, a main Moroccan N�O umbrella organisation, sums up 
the position valid still today: “Financing is no almsgiving by the North, because there are 
doubtless interests, declared and implicit, even though the idea of an imperialist and Zion-
ist conspiracy has been discarded.”86 Another matter often stressed by interviewees is the 
fact that no financing, including that from the Moroccan state and from the private sector, is 
altruistic and without interests. Such funding can thus be equally, if not more problematic 
than financing from abroad.87
The pragmatic position on foreign funding has remained relatively stable over many years 
(with the exception of attitudes towards the US government as a partner, as discussed be-
low). It crystallized during the early days of civil society activism and international involve-
ment, when the issue was widely discussed by civil society actors.88
There is some disagreement as to whether acceptance of foreign funds or participation 
in foreign-funded activities changes Moroccans’ perceptions of a specific N�O or politi-
cal party. Some claim that Moroccans have a negative image of organisations that accept 
money from abroad, seeing it as a form of “prostitution”.89 Others stress that, on the con-
trary, foreign funds permit a certain visibility. The majority of interviewees thin� this is a 
non-issue, however: “Financing is not important, what matters are the actions. Society is 
not interested in this issue,” according to a female PJD MP who is also the president of a 
major women’s N�O in the country.90 A colleague from the at times repressed Justice et 
Spiritualité concurs: “We would not criticise others [for accepting Western funds], as we 
also receive some through the small organisations in our networ�”.91 A �een observer of 
associational life in Morocco agrees: “People loo� first at who’s involved in the N�O, then 
what it does. The origin of funds does not really come up”.92
The issue of Western financing is not totally absent from the debate, however. During the 
discussion on the new Mudawana, Islamists used the “foreign funding card” against wom-
en’s N�Os that supported the reforms. However, most observers, including those from 
secular N�Os, saw this as a mere temporary glitch due to the heat of the debate, and as 
an argument that was quic�ly abandoned because it did not “stic�”. In recent years, and 
according to an experienced N�O activist, “they have become more careful and their dis-
course no longer leans on that �ind of argument”.93 In order to avoid any potential criticism, 
some N�Os refuse foreign funds for specific campaigns. The Association Marocaine des 
Droits de l’Homme (AMDH), for instance, has chosen to rely only on domestic funds for 
its campaign to de-penalize homosexuality, otherwise “people will use the acceptance of 
foreign funds to discredit us”. AMDH does this even though they consider that their “image 
is good” and that “it is difficult to blac�en us”.94
The pragmatic acceptance of Western democracy promotion does not however mean that 
differences are absent or that acceptance is in any way unconditional or universal. PJD MPs 
and party members, as well as N�Os close to the party, stress that decisions on whether 
to participate in Western-sponsored programmes and events are ta�en on a decentralized, 
individual basis. Thus many, but not all, PJD members participate in parliamentary training 
sessions sponsored by USAID through NDI (see below). Party representatives and repre-
sentatives of N�Os close to PJD participate in events organized by, for example, the Friedrich 
Ebert Foundation, and are eager to stress their openness and interest in international coop-
eration, discussion, and other exchanges. At the same time, they are more inclined to stress 
their relative disinterest for certain programmes, or Western programmes’ lac� of fit with 
Moroccan realities. Moreover, PJD-associated N�Os and the Justice and Spirituality move-
ment are, as a rule, more reluctant to receive Western funds than their secular counterparts. 
“We are not for foreign financing, but prefer wor�ing with our own funds or with the govern-
ment”; “Western financing, with its strings attached, does not respect Moroccan values”; 
and “it is a �ind of corruption” are some statements expressed.95 Moreover, some secular 
N�O representatives testify to an increasing malaise when it comes to the relationship with 
Western actors, which is tainting the otherwise relatively rosy picture. “People are more and 
more wary of the West in general, given Iraq, Palestine, the issue of migration and the image 
in the West of Moroccans and Arabs”, according to one N�O representative.96
The fact that journalists from several newspapers have benefited from American-spon-
sored training does not raise any eyebrows within the Moroccan journalistic profession. 
Two �ey figures in the field said that “We have no problem with that” and that “a scientific 
education is a good thing”.97 Thus, the Syndicat national de la presse marocaine has not 
adopted any official position on the issue (although it has in other circumstances criticized 
American interference, see below). It is a matter up to each publication and journalist to 
decide, seeing as “Moroccan journalists are mature”, according to the secretary general 
of the union.98 Within Islamist circles, the decision of the editor in chief of the Islamist Al-
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Tajdid daily to accept US-sponsored education and training is neither greeted with joy, nor 
with outright condemnation: “I’m not against his decision, but not for it either. It is up to 
everyone to ma�e his own choices” says Mustafa Ramid, a PJD parliamentarian often seen 
as one of the “haw�s” within the party.99
It is widely recognized that the United States is viewed with great suspicion as a promoter 
of democracy in the Arab world, even within the United States itself – and Morocco is no 
exception in this respect.100 This study confirms, but nuances, this fact. Moroccan N�Os 
are split as to their perception of American democracy promotion efforts. Some N�Os ac-
cept American government aid, while a sizable share of Moroccan associations refuse it 
outright.101 Resistance to US initiatives is at times based on disagreement with US stances 
in the Arab region, such as the war in Iraq and its support for Israel over the Palestinians. In 
other instances, it is due to the more “offensive” US strategy on democracy promotion (see 
section 1), which is often perceived as “meddling in” or “infiltrating” the internal affairs of 
Morocco. Such unease is not only, or indeed primarily, an Islamist phenomenon: some of 
the fiercest opposition has come from secular N�Os. Neither is unease solely an N�O af-
fair: certain American actions have led to a strong reaction from the Moroccan royal palace 
and from political parties across the political spectrum.
Timing has also been an issue as regards some US initiatives. The only larger US policy 
initiative that was specifically mentioned by many Moroccan interlocutors was BMENA 
– perhaps surprisingly given its relative lac� of success. The timing of this initiative – a year 
after the US invasion of Iraq – made many Moroccans perceive it as another example of US 
attempts to heavy-handedly push through its agenda in the region.
Those N�Os that accept American government assistance stress that they are not “politi-
cised”, and that as long as there is no meddling with the goals and programming or po-
litical interference of any other sort, there is no problem with accepting US government 
funds. One N�O responsible even stated that the vocal refusal of US funds was a “political 
overstatement” by associations wanting to “cover their activities with the Moroccan gov-
ernment”.102 Some N�Os cite timing – in the case of joint programmes started before the 
Iraq war – for the existence of programmes with US government-sponsored bodies. “If the 
project had started today, we would have declined” they stress.
Other Moroccan N�Os’ refusal to cooperate with US government agencies, also extended 
in particular to IRI as a Republican institution, is based on the lac� of respect for democracy 
and human rights that they believe the United States showed by invading Iraq in 2003 and 
the US policy on Palestine. One interviewee, who has wor�ed for a number of years in the 
N�O sector, stated: “Even I, considered to be the most flexible and open [with regards to 
foreign funding], am now reluctant vis-à-vis the US”.103 One main critic of US government 
aid acceptance explained: “It indeed is a poisoned chalice for serious N�Os that thin� they 
serve a good cause by accepting American aid, but then end up losing their souls and be-
ing discredited. Imagine for one second that AMDH accepts assistance from the American 
administration or American N�Os close to it, and it’s finished, our credibility.”104
In the autumn of 2006, a coalition including some major Moroccan N�Os105 initiated a peti-
tion to boycott the American embassy in Morocco and US activities in the country. It was then 
reiterated in 2007.106 The main reason for this was the American strategy being pursued in 
the Middle East, and specifically the “colonization” of Iraq. The American ambassador to Mo-
rocco, Thomas Reilly, was also condemned for his “questionable declarations and actions” 
that went against “commonly accepted diplomatic tradition”.107 One reason for the critique of 
the American embassy in particular was its efforts to find interlocutors in the media sector:
The services of the [American] diplomatic representation have, on several oc-
casions, contacted the Syndicat national de la presse marocaine to offer their 
assistance... Faced with the rejection of this initiative, [they] unsuccessfully 
resorted to approaching an agency to play this role. The American embassy 
has tried to propose its programmes to the SNPM sections, but they have all 
refused the offer... The SNPM considers that the programmes of the American 
administration aim to spread specific concepts of its hegemonic policy in the 
region... The petition has denounced US attempts to infiltrate Arab media 
and civil society in a bid to embellish its image and turn attention away from 
the crimes committed in Iraq and other regions of the world.108
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Most political parties have at times boycotted events organized by the US embassy in Mo-
rocco. These boycotts have usually been limited in time, being used to mar� disagreement 
with specific US actions in the region: the invasion in Iraq again being the prime example.109 
MPs, in particular those of the PJD, have been critical of the USAID project with the Moroc-
can lower house of parliament. Reasons vary; therefore, the deputy leader stresses the fact 
that the decision was ta�en by the government, rather than by the parliament itself, while 
another PJD MP as�s “why should they come and ‘teach’ us when they themselves are not 
equal to the tas�?”110 A close observer of the process noted that it was USAID’s role as the 
instigator that posed a problem: “with an American N�O, it would have been easier”.111 
Across the board, interviewees are eager to stress that they are not “against the US, only 
against its current policies” and that they have good relations with some Americans and 
have participated in some US-sponsored events.
Moroccan actors ta�e the distinction between state and non-state actors quite seriously. 
Thus, even actors that would refuse official American support can imagine wor�ing with 
American N�Os. For example, the AMDH representative who considered American aid a 
poisoned chalice, simultaneously felt “a thousand times closer to the American pacifists 
that fight for the end of the occupation of Iraq than to certain Moroccans who, in the name 
of fighting terrorism, violate people’s human rights while lying low in front of the American 
master” (see also section on Western civil society below).112
The IRI opinion polls of 2005 and 2006 triggered controversy in Morocco (for more details 
about these polls, see section 2 above). Members of both main traditional parties agree 
that they were “not professional”, and the Istiqlal Secretary �eneral made a pronounce-
ment against the poll.113 “These polls were politically dishonest in a country where democ-
ratisation is still fragile. They don’t help”, according to a leading USFP representative.114 
Some observers saw the results as tilted in PJD’s favour.115 For the PJD, in contrast, the 
result was “truthful”, but its representatives stress that they did not want IRI to under-
ta�e such a poll.116 Shortly after the polls, the government proposed a law curtailing politi-
cal opinion surveys in Morocco, and the palace was reportedly “rattled by what it saw as 
American meddling in Moroccan affairs”.117
The democracy promotion efforts of the European Union and European states are generally 
better received than those of the Americans. In contrast to claims in some other studies,118 
no interviewee mentioned European cultural imperialism, the EU position on the Israeli 
invasion of Lebanon in July 2006, or the failure of the EU to recognize Hamas in their dis-
cussion of EU democracy promotion. Unease regarding migration and Europe’s policy of 
following the American lead after 11 September 2001 was, however, highlighted on a couple 
of occasions, but very rarely in comparison to the repeated comments about US actions in 
the region.
The reason for judging the Americans, but not the Europeans, according to their wider poli-
cies in the Middle East, is, according to one observer of Moroccan civil society, because Mo-
roccans’ �nowledge of Europe is much better than that of the US. The US is therefore more 
li�ely to be judged according to its international political stances, while Moroccans are 
familiar enough with the nuances of European political life to understand even adverse Eu-
ropean policies.119 This does not however mean that the relationship is friction-free: “N�Os 
are critical of the EU, but it doesn’t go as far as boycotting”, one N�O observer noted.120 
Nor does it mean that relations are robust enough to withstand any future test. In fact, al-
though EU countries have a lower profile in terms of democracy promotion in Morocco than 
the EU as such, some of these countries have encountered limited boycotts, particularly 
the United �ingdom, which suffers due to its association with the US agenda, and Italy, 
because of certain statements made by its government ministers.121
The potentially most controversial aspect of EU assistance seems to be its exclusion of 
religious parties and N�Os, which contrasts with the more inclusive US approach (see sec-
tion 1 above). A number of interviewees, from secular parties and N�Os, as well as their 
religious counterparts, find that the EU policy is flawed. The president of the USFP parlia-
mentary group, Ahmed Zaidi, stressed that “it is not right. As long as the parties accept 
the democratic rules of the game, they should be accepted. I’m against exclusion”.122 “The 
European Union and other donors should respect the diversity of Moroccan society, and 
open up to all political leanings – that’s what it means to be democratic”, stressed one PJD 
parliamentarian.123 According to the deputy leader of the PJD, “European politicians are 
hostage to public opinion in Europe – that’s normal, but the result is there: Europe finances 
the others against us”.124 Nadia Yassine of the Justice and Spirituality movement stresses 
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that, through this approach, “the EU misses the real vectors of society”.125 Other relevant 
actors, in contrast, are forcefully against the inclusion of the PJD and other Islamists in EU 
programmes. The reasons given include the funding they allegedly receive from the �ulf 
and Iran (but which, according to other representatives of secular organisations, does not 
exist) and the fact that the Islamists do not respect the basic rules of democracy, such 
as pluralism and human rights. “They would not sign the Barcelona Declaration, so why 
should the EU fund them?” as�s one observer of Moroccan civil society.126 At the same time, 
it is unclear whether Islamists would accept European funding. One N�O representative 
and PJD member, for example, stressed that with European funding, the goals of Moroccan 
N�Os are often distorted, and “our association rejects this, and thus the EU refusal does 
not pose a problem to us”.127
Another significant problem with EU funding, unrelated to the question of legitimacy 
and credibility, is the “extremely cumbersome” EU procedures, cited spontaneously by 
almost every single respondent. “They are not adapted to developing countries”, con-
cluded one interviewee.128 The administrative and other requirements are such that a 
number of N�Os, including very resourceful ones, hesitate, or even entirely rule out, ap-
plying for EU funds.
Western and international N�Os are in principle ideal partners for many Moroccan actors, 
since they do not have the �ind of political interests attached to states – a fact stressed by 
many interviewees. Thus, although Nadia Yassine of the Justice and Spirituality Association 
rejects US government assistance given that it would “tarnish our reputation and be a real 
stamp on us”, she also admitted that when she received an invitation from the University 
of California Ber�eley: “I jumped on the occasion, as this �ind of civil society collaboration 
interests us a lot”. She also saw the mouvements altermondialistes (alter-globalization 
movements) as promising.129
Western N�Os also ran� highly among the preferred Western funders. One foundation, 
Friedrich Ebert, stands out as being almost unanimously respected in Morocco. As a civil 
society representative put it: “Everyone is fine wor�ing with them”. This is because the 
foundation is considered serious, flexible and easy to wor� with. Additionally, its repre-
sentation in Morocco is directed by Moroccans. A number of other Western N�Os, which 
have wor�ed in the country for many years, enjoy a similar reputation. However, in general, 
and according to N�O representatives, Moroccan N�Os thin� in terms of “projects” rather 
than “donors” (except as concerns US government assistance, as discussed above).130 They 
will thus submit project ideas to the donors they believe most li�ely to be interested and 
�nowledgeable in that particular area.
This picture is not without its blots, however. One problem recognized by many interview-
ees is the opaque character of how Western N�Os are funded. While the sources of funding 
for associations and foundations with a relatively long history in Morocco, such as Oxfam-
Novib and Oxfam Québec, are relatively clear, most of the N�O representatives interviewed 
for this study agree that many international N�Os are insufficiently transparent in this re-
gard, and that this posed a problem. “One has to dig into their identity” since “no [N�O] 
donor will say where its funds stem from; and among Moroccan N�Os there is a discus-
sion on this issue”.131 The Espace associatif notes that “foreign associations appear, chase 
projects and control credit lines, while never revealing what has been decided or what has 
effectively been given”.132 One N�O representative nevertheless noted that the require-
ment that all Moroccan N�Os declare their sources of finance to the government mitigates 
the problem of opaque funding of some Western N�Os.133
The issue of international election monitoring did not seem controversial among those in-
terviewed for this report. According to one political party representative: “It’s done every-
where, so why not in the Arab world? It’s a plus”.134
The international observation mission of the 2007 parliamentary elections is perceived to 
have been relatively “light”, having deployed few observers on the ground and a relatively 
small number of experts before and after the poll. “This was a symbolic mission, with some 
observers visiting select polling stations”, according to one close observer.135 This evalu-
ation has led to some criticism: “The control on election day was not good”, according to 
one PJD representative.136 Others brush it aside, explaining that “it is a favourite Moroccan 
tradition to be dissatisfied once the election results are �nown”.137
Western civil society: 
A mixed picture
Electoral observation
125 Interview, Nadia Yassine, Head of Women’s sec-
tion, Justice and Spirituality Association, Salé, 12 June 
2008.
126 Telephone interview, Driss �hrouz, Professor , 
Mohamed V University Rabat and Secretary-�eneral of 
�ERM, 8 July 2008.
127 Interview, Bassima Ha��aoui, MP, PJD, and Presi-
dent Organisation du renouveau de la prise de con-
science féminine, Rabat, 11 June 2008.
128 Interview, Azeddine A�esbi, former Secretary-�en-
eral, Transparency Maroc, 9 June 2008.
129 Interview, Nadia Yassine, Head of Women’s sec-
tion, Justice and Spirituality Association, Salé, 12 June 
2008.
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A number of interviewees found great similarities in the analysis and recommendations 
offered by the national and international observers. The international observation mission, 
through its first report and associated press conference, “put its finger on crucial prob-
lems”, such as the Moroccan constitutional arrangements and the lac� of a proper role for 
parliament.138 However, in the opinion of one N�O observer, the subsequent national con-
gratulations from the West, stating that “Morocco is advancing on its path to democracy”, 
undermined the conclusions of the report.139
130 Interview, Moroccan N�O representative, Rabat, 8 
June 2008; interview, Azeddine A�esbi, former Secre-
tary-�eneral, Transparency Maroc, 9 June 2008.
131 Interview, Bassima Ha��aoui, MP, PJD, and Presi-
dent Organisation du renouveau de la prise de con-
science féminine, Rabat, 11 June 2008; interview, Mo-
roccan N�O representative, Rabat, 8 June 2008.
132 Espace associatif, 2002,  p.94.
133 Interview, Moroccan N�O representative, Rabat, 
8 June 2008.
134 Interview, Fatiha Saddas, member of Union social-
iste des forces populaires (USPF), Rabat, 7 June 2008.
135 Telephone interview, Mohamed El Ayadi, research-
er, Hassan II University, Casablanca, 7 July 2008.
136 Interview, Lahcen Daoudi, Vice-Secretary-�eneral 
PJD, Rabat, 10 June 2008.
137 Telephone interview, Mohamed El Ayadi, research-
er, Hassan II University, Casablanca, 7 July 2008.
138 Telephone interview, Moroccan N�O representa-
tive, 23 May 2008; interview, Lahcen Daoudi, vice-sec-
retary general PJD, Rabat, 10 June 2008.
139 Telephone interview, Moroccan N�O representa-
tive, 23 May 2008.
Pragmatism Rather than Backlash:
Moroccan Perceptions of Western Democracy Promotion
22
73 November 2008
Conclusions 
and policy 
recommendations
This study has shown that, in contrast to a number of other Arab states, Morocco has not 
experienced a total bac�lash against democracy promotion. It has also made clear that a 
focus on the actual “targets” of democracy assistance – namely, N�Os, political party ac-
tivists and parliamentarians, representatives of the judiciary and the state, journalists, as 
well as academics – can bring out a richer and more nuanced picture of how democracy pro-
motion is perceived in the recipient country, in comparison to merely analysing perceptions 
amongst leaders or the population at large. In Morocco, the picture that emerges is one of 
pragmatism. This pragmatism means that relevant players very rarely adopt an “all or noth-
ing position”, which would imply star� alternatives: either you accept democracy funding 
from the West, or you altogether reject association with Western democracy promotion; 
either you trust your Western partners blindly, or you don’t even trust them for a second; ei-
ther you wor� with all US partners, or you avoid any contact with American democracy pro-
motion efforts; either you thin� foreign funding is always positive, or you believe it never 
is; either you thin� refusal to participate in democracy promotion activities should be used 
as a tool of political protest, or you thin� it never should be, etc. This is not tantamount to 
“flip-flopping” from side-to-side or to an “anything goes” attitude, but rather means that 
actors have critically reflected on the issue of Western funding and reached quite nuanced 
positions with carefully delimited boundaries. The fact that virtually every actor partici-
pates in at least some international initiatives is of particular importance in the Moroccan 
case – no one can ta�e the “moral high ground” on this issue. It is equally important that 
the Moroccan government has never in any way criticized associations for accepting for-
eign funding, but has, on the contrary, encouraged N�Os to see� such financing.
Proponents of democracy assistance generally lament the lac� of resources devoted to the 
endeavour, and the sums committed to such initiatives are, as this report also ma�es clear, 
very limited. However, the interviews for this report revealed that the importance of democ-
racy assistance reaches well beyond the modest means invested. It is an issue that parlia-
mentarians, political party members, N�O representatives, and state agents �now well and 
discuss regularly, and on which they have, more often than not, adopted a clear position.
This does not however mean that all is well and good: US government assistance is con-
tentious, as is the EU policy of excluding moderate Islamists. The opacity of some foreign 
donors (particularly N�Os and quasi-N�Os) as to their own sources of funding is also a 
potential problem. The misuse of funds by meddlesome donors, as well as Moroccan N�Os, 
is always a threat, although one not currently acute in Morocco. With respect to these and 
other associated issues, the following policy recommendations seem warranted in guiding 
future Western democracy promotion endeavours in Morocco:
Western government donors should continue to demonstrate, and improve, trans-
parency in their activities, partners, funding schemes, etc. This would mirror the 
importance Moroccan actors, especially the more professional civil society associa-
tions, generally place on their own transparency with regard to the funding received 
and what it is used for.
�overnments should be careful not to obfuscate their funding for Western N�Os 
and other agencies wor�ing in Morocco. Particularly the US, with its many qua-
si-governmental foundations and agencies (IRI, NDI, NED, etc), should avoid the 
temptation to ma�e its assistance more “palatable” by channelling it through N�Os 
in a less than perfectly transparent manner. This is absolutely crucial in preventing 
that a country such as Morocco, so far not prone to adopting conspiracy theories 
or to engaging in “CIA spotting”, does not come to harbour such suspicions, which 
would have adverse consequences for the promotion of democracy in the country 
as a whole.
International N�Os, quasi-N�Os and other agencies must become far more 
transparent as to their own sources of funding. Some already are, but many are 
not, which poses a moral dilemma and a potential for a bac�lash amongst Moroc-
can N�Os.
The US government should consider the issue of timing in its efforts to step up 
activities in Morocco. The present moment, when the image of the US has reached 
a historical low, is perhaps not the most appropriate for extending democracy pro-
motion in a country such as Morocco. In contrast, this recommendation does not 
apply to purely non-governmental US initiatives, which have not suffered from the 
generalized distaste for the US government.
International actors should continue to be (or, in certain cases, become) “hands-
•
•
•
•
•
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off” regarding priorities, activities, agenda-setting, etc. given that this is crucial for 
the credibility of Moroccan N�Os.
Inclusion of Islamists that accept the democratic rules of the game and are will-
ing to engage with Western countries as partners in existing democracy promotion 
programmes seems important. Exclusion, such as currently practiced by the EU, 
may lead to: (a) facile Islamist critiques of organisations that accept Western assis-
tance as being “bought” or “un-Moroccan”; (b) search for other sources of funding, 
which might entail radicalisation; and, most importantly, (c) a sense of an unequal 
playing field, which, as Moroccan actors are quic� to point out, goes against the 
basic principles of democracy. Europe should therefore reconsider its rigid stance 
on democratic and moderate Islamists.
Policy coherence (i.e. ensuring that all foreign policies promote – or at least do not 
wor� against – democracy and human rights) should be improved. This is difficult 
for Western countries, given their reluctance or incapacity to deal with migration 
issues and the terrorist threat, as well as their prioritisation of short-term stability 
and economic lin�s with the ruling elites. In those cases where policy incoherence 
is the most blatant, countries might have to ponder whether their programmes are 
still viable and credible.
�iven the severe shortages of domestic funding, unsound in the long-term, the 
Moroccan government should do everything in its power to encourage domestic 
funding for N�Os that reaches well beyond the royal foundations, recognising that 
this is a country with a sizable wealthy elite and an emerging middle class. This 
may, for instance, include facilitating N�O access to the status of “utilité publique”. 
As things stand at present, many Moroccan associations would collapse without 
foreign funding. 
•
•
•
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